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1  | INTRODUC TION
How does ill health affect subjective well‐being (SWB; here operation‐
alized as self‐rated satisfaction with life), and is it possible to quantify 
the impact of illness on SWB? The answers to such questions matter 
not only for our understanding of SWB, but also for policymakers who 
may wish to value (for the purposes of resource allocation) different 
health states in terms of the loss of SWB that they bring. One possible 
method for informing policy is to simply ask people about the impact 
that different health states would have on their future SWB. Because 
this method relies on people's self‐reports, it enables non‐paternalistic 
policy decisions. Unfortunately, it is well established that people 
typically misestimate the affective consequences of future events 
(Kahneman & Snell, 1990; Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). 
These affective forecasting errors can lead to a mismatch between 
the expected impact of health states on one's SWB, and the likely ac‐
tual change in SWB if such health states are experienced. Here, we 
examined these affective forecasting errors in the specific context of 
health states and SWB. More specifically, the aim of this paper was to 
examine people's ability to forecast health‐related SWB changes and 
to determine whether it is possible to debias people's forecasts using 
psychological distancing manipulations.
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Abstract
One way of informing health policy decisions is to ask people about the impact that 
different health states would have on their future subjective well‐being. The pre‐
sent research explored the relation between anticipated and experienced changes 
in health‐related subjective well‐being, and examined whether affective forecast‐
ing errors could be reduced by psychological distancing manipulations. Using survey 
methodology, we tested whether people can accurately estimate the impact of dif‐
ferent possible health states on their subjective well‐being. We also manipulated psy‐
chological distance: Forecasts were made about present self, future self, or others. 
Based on construal level theory and past work on affective forecasting errors, our 
prediction was that increasing psychological distance may reduce the mismatch be‐
tween anticipated and experienced impact of health states on subjective well‐being. 
We found that the impact of ill health on subjective well‐being was greatly over‐
predicted and that this overprediction was not eliminated when participants were 
asked to make predictions about themselves in the future or about other people. 
Consistent with past work, we found that our participants correctly expected that 
their subjective well‐being would deteriorate more if they experienced the highest 
levels of mental illness as compared to the highest intensities of pain or most severe 
limitations to physical functioning.
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1.1 | Affective forecasting
Affective	 forecasting	 theory	 is	 motivated	 by	 empirical	 findings	
showing that people cannot accurately predict their feelings associ‐
ated with hypothetical future events (Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002). 
Numerous studies have shown that people overestimate how un‐
happy they would be if they experienced a particular negative health 
outcome (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), including suffering from visual 
impairment, asthma, colostomy, and various other chronic illnesses 
(Loewenstein et al., 2003; Ubel et al., 2001; Ubel, Loewenstein, 
Schwarz,	 &	 Smith,	 2005).	Whereas	 people	 are	 relatively	 accurate	
in expecting that negative outcomes will have a negative impact on 
their happiness, they are often wrong about the intensity and du‐
ration with which a feeling will be experienced. More specifically, 
people typically both overpredict the initial intensity of an emotional 
reaction and fail to anticipate how quickly such emotions will dissi‐
pate with time (Gilbert et al., 2002).
The robustness of affective forecasting errors poses a serious 
challenge to medical decision‐making and health policy‐making. 
Patients	 often	 must	 decide	 between	 medical	 treatments	 on	 the	
basis of their beliefs about the expected impact each alternative 
outcome will have on their future SWB. Individuals may mispredict 
how a particular treatment will impact them if they (a) over‐focus 
on the concrete details of a future health status (focalism: Wilson, 
Wheatley,	Meyers,	Gilbert,	&	Axsom,	2000),	(b)	fail	to	anticipate	that	
they will likely adapt to living in a particular health status (immune 
neglect:	 Gilbert,	 Pinel,	 Wilson,	 Blumberg,	 &	 Wheatley,	 1998),	 or	
(c) project their current feelings onto their expectations about the 
future health state (projection bias: Kermer, Driver‐Linn, Wilson, & 
Gilbert, 2006). The same problems may also prevent policy‐makers 
from using people's anticipated SWB changes as reliable input into 
their	decision‐making	(Halpern	&	Arnold,	2008).
1.2 | Attenuating errors and 
psychological distancing
Limited amount of research exists on possible ways in which the 
forecasting errors can be attenuated. Wesp and colleagues (2009) 
found that forecasts about positive events (e.g., buying a new car) 
were less overoptimistic when participants were primed to think 
about abstract rather than concrete concepts. This manipulation was 
based on construal level theory, which describes the mental repre‐
sentation of psychological distance. In this theory, as psychological 
distance increases, “people tend to think in more abstract, general, 
de‐contextualized, high‐level construals” (Bhatia & Walasek, 2016; 
Polman,	2012,	p.	142;	Trope,	Liberman,	&	Wakslak,	2007),	with	this	
assumption holding for spatial, temporal, and social distances (Trope 
&	Liberman,	2010).	In	the	study	by	Wesp,	Sandry,	Prisco,	and	Sarte	
(2009) low construal (more concrete) priming encouraged partici‐
pants to think less about a prototypical positive event, but focus 
more on the concrete details of future events.
With respect to forecasts about negative events, one might 
expect that the opposite should be true—overly negative affective 
predictions could be attenuated if people focus more on the abstract 
properties of the future event. In line with this reasoning, Kross, 
Ayduk,	and	Mischel	 (2005)	 found	that	 individuals	who	deliberated	
about the reasons behind past negative experiences showed less 
intense emotional reactions when they engaged in an abstract and 
distanced evaluations, relative to participants who evaluated events 
from a more concrete and immersed perspective. In a similar vein, 
albeit without reference to construal level theory, Comerford (2011) 
was able to reduce forecasting errors by asking participants to think 
about the average affective responses to a negative event. The ef‐
fectiveness of this manipulation was attributed to a reduction in fo‐
calism—participants who average their feelings are less influenced 
by a vivid memory of a specific negative event.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that psychological dis‐
tance can influence affective forecasting errors. Specifically, more 
abstract representations could reduce the overly negative forecasts 
of affective reactions to negative events.
1.3 | Present study
In the present paper, we tested whether it is possible to use peo‐
ple's stated beliefs (here self‐reported forecasts about future SWB) 
to accurately estimate the impact of different health states on their 
SWB. We were particularly concerned with the potential mismatch 
between people's predictions about the SWB consequences of ad‐
verse health effects (“anticipated SWB”) and the loss of SWB that 
they actually undergo (“experienced SWB”) when the events occur.
Based on construal level theory, we used manipulations of psy‐
chological distance in an attempt to minimize the impact of the fo‐
cusing illusion that leads to affective forecasting errors in people's 
predictions	 about	 their	 future	 SWB.	As	we	were	most	 concerned	
with potentially adverse health states, and the key aim of our manip‐
ulation was to limit the impact of one's current state on judgments 
about the future, we designed two treatments that encouraged in‐
dividuals to use high construal‐level thinking when evaluating future 
events. In one treatment group, we asked participants to make judg‐
ments about other people: We require them to consider an average 
person from the population, and predict his/her change in SWB in 
different health states. In a second treatment, we asked respondents 
to imagine themselves in their future (in their late 60s) making each 
judgment. Building on construal‐level theory (Trope & Liberman, 
2010), we expected that judgments about one's self in the future and 
judgments about other people will be more abstract (high‐level con‐
strual) than temporally and personally more proximate judgments 
about current self (low‐level construal). Our prediction was that in‐
creasing psychological distance will reduce the mismatch between 
anticipated and experienced impact of health states on SWB.
Our study is novel in that we elicited people's forecasts of future 
health states defined in terms of SF‐6D, a widely used classification 
system used in health economics. Using SF‐6D allows us to compare 
our participants' predictions with the results obtained by Brazier, 
Roberts,	and	Deverill	(2002)	and	Dolan,	Lee,	and	Peasgood	(2012),	
who used the same taxonomy. Dolan et al. (2012), who analyzed data 
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from	 the	 British	Household	 Panel	 Survey,	 regressed	 respondents’	
life satisfaction on their health scores (as measured by the SF‐6D) 
and several control variables. The scores showed a pattern different 
from those obtained by Brazier et al. (2002), who used a modified 
standard gamble method to estimate the weights of different health 
states of the SF‐6D. In contrast to the tariff scores, the SWB anal‐
ysis found that problems related to mental health and vitality have 
a much larger negative effect on SWB than pain or limitations in 
physical functioning. Beyond reducing affective forecasting errors, 
our secondary goal was to compare estimates based on our meth‐
odology with those obtained using a revealed SWB approach (Dolan 
et al., 2012) and standard preference estimation techniques (Brazier 
et al., 2002).
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Participants
In our study, it was important that we had access to a diverse sam‐
ple of participants. We therefore used the crowdsourcing platform, 
Amazon	Mechanical	Turk.	The	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk	population	
offers a more diverse population than most traditional approaches 
do (Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010) and partici‐
pants on this platform do not differ significantly from those used 
in population‐based national surveys in the United States (Levay, 
Freese, & Druckman, 2016).
We	advertised	our	study	on	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk,	offering	
prospective	participants	$1.00	 in	 return	 for	approximately	15	min	
of their time. Our aim was to recruit at least 600 participants. 
Participant	ages	ranged	from	20	to	76	years	(M = 39.22, SD	=	11.34).	
In	 our	 sample,	 324	 participants	were	 female,	 269	were	male,	 and	
1 selected “other.” Most of our participants were in full‐time em‐
ployment	(480),	whereas	some	were	retired	(25),	unemployed	(33),	
in	full‐time	education	(2),	looking	after	the	family	(34),	or	did	not	pro‐
vide a specific answer (20). Our sample varied in terms of income 
bracket	(see	Table	A1	in	Appendix	I).	Ethical	approval	was	obtained	
prior	to	collecting	data.	Participants	were	required	to	give	consent	
before participating in the study.
2.2 | Materials and measures
2.2.1 | SF‐6D
The SF‐6D is a shortened version of SF‐36 and SF‐12, and it is 
widely used as a measure of general health in clinical populations. 
Beyond assessing validity of health interventions, SF‐6D is also used 
to generate a preference‐based index of health (based on quality 
adjusted life years) for cost–benefit analysis. The SF‐6D consist of 
six dimensions, including role limitation, social functioning, pain, 
mental health, and vitality (Brazier et al., 2002). The original scoring 
(i.e., weights) for SF‐6D dimensions was obtained using preference‐
based method—standard gambles.
2.2.2 | Ten‐item personality inventory
The	 Ten‐Item	 Personality	 Inventory	 (Gosling,	 Rentfrow,	 &	 Swann,	
2003) is a widely used measure of the Big Five personality traits 
(openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neu‐
roticism). Despite its short length, this inventory has been shown 
to have reasonable convergent and discriminant validity as well as 
test‐retest reliability. This questionnaire is primarily used in research 
in which personality is not the primary topic of interest. We chose to 
include it in the present research to assess whether individual differ‐
ences in personality influence the ability to predict impact of health 
on SWB (cf. Boyce & Wood, 2011).
2.2.3 | Demographics
Following Dolan et al. (2012) we collected various demographic 
information about our participants. More specifically, we asked all 
individuals about their age, gender, annual income, occupation, and 
marital status. The exact wordings of all demographic questions are 
listed	in	Appendix	II.
2.2.4 | Subjective well‐being
Each individual was also required to indicate his/her level of life sat‐
isfaction using a slider, with 0 representing “not satisfied” and 100 
representing “completely satisfied.”
2.3 | Procedure
After	seeing	 the	consent	 form	and	participant	 information	sheet,	all	
participants provided information about their age, gender, annual in‐
come, occupation, marital status, and current level of life satisfaction.
The following screen contained our key manipulation. Each par‐
ticipant was randomly allocated to one of three conditions. In the 
present self‐treatment, respondents read the following instructions: 
“We are studying how you believe different health outcomes would 
affect your [bold font in the original instructions] current life satis‐
faction.” In the future self‐condition, the word in bold was replaced 
and people were instead asked to state their beliefs about the SWB 
of “yourself in the future in your late 60's,” and the SWB “of other 
people” for the average other	 condition.	 Participants	 then	 moved	
onto the next screen where they began answering questions on how 
they believed experiencing each of the different levels of the health 
dimensions of the SF‐6D would affect their life satisfaction in the 
present/future or the life satisfaction of an average other, depending 
on the condition to which they were assigned. The questions were 
presented as sliders, with each level of a single domain appearing 
on the same screen but in a random order. The adjustments in SWB 
were made relative to a specific reference point. In the present self‐ 
and future self‐treatments, this value was the participant's previ‐
ously stated SWB score. In the average‐other condition, participants 
were informed that the mean life satisfaction score in the United 
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States	is	74/100,	to	provide	a	neutral	anchor	value.	(This	figure	was	
based on the mean self‐reported life satisfaction of 200,000 people 
aged 16 and over reported by the UK's Office for National Statistics 
based on the Integrated Household Survey conducted between 
April	2011	and	March	2012,	and	was	chosen	to	ensure	the	best	pos‐
sible comparability with the results of Dolan et al. (2012).
Following completion of all SF‐6D questions, participants com‐
pleted the 10‐item personality inventory. The survey concluded with 
each individual completing the nonmodified SF‐6D to indicate their 
actual health state.
2.4 | Data preparation
In total, we recorded 618 responses. If data originated from the 
same	 IP	 address,	we	deleted	 later	 responses	 unless	 individual	 en‐
tries overlapped in time of completion, in which case we removed 
all responses. From the remaining 613 responses, we removed par‐
ticipants who did not complete the task in its entirety (n = 19). Our 
final	 sample	 consisted	of	 data	 from	594	 individuals.	 Raw	data	 are	
available	from	the	Open	Science	Framework	at	https	://osf.io/sg72f/	
?view_only=921d2	a5afb	fd4a0	7a2a0	7245d	f2c8f5f.
3  | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To screen for inconsistent responses, we computed nonparametric 
Kendall correlations for participants' SWB predictions in each domain. 
Negative correlations indicated increased expected SWB as severity 
increases.	As	such	results	likely	reflected	lack	of	understanding	of	the	
elicitation mechanism, we analyzed only data from participants whose 
correlation was larger than .011 for all domains. We also excluded nine 
participants	 aged	 over	 59	 in	 the	 future	 self‐condition;	 age	was	 not	
viewed as a relevant exclusion condition in the other two conditions.
The	data	from	the	remaining	447	participants	were	analyzed	using	
hierarchical	mixed	effect	modeling	(lme4	package	in	R,	2014);	severity	
was nested within SF‐6D domains. Models assessed the impact of dif‐
ferent	health	states	on	predicted	SWB.	Participants'	responses	were	
standardized to create SWB scores by subtracting them from the per‐
son's current life satisfaction score (or from the average well‐being for 
the average‐other condition). SWB scores were first regressed on the 
SF‐6D domains and severities of health. In the more complex version 
of the model, gender, age, age squared, income, employment status, 
and marital status were included to replicate the analysis of Dolan and 
colleagues.2 In all models, random intercepts for both domain and se‐
verity	of	health	were	included.	A	likelihood	ratio	test	determined	that	
the full model did offer a significantly better fit (χ2(32)	 =	 389.48	
p < .001), but, consistent with Dolan et al. (2012), we found only a 
negligible improvement in model‐fit statistic (conditional R2: sim‐
ple	=	81.90%	vs.	full	=	85.81%;	Nakagawa	&	Schielzeth,	2013).	In	the	
following analysis, we therefore focus on the simple model.3
To assess whether perspective (self, other, future self) influenced 
SWB ratings, we included a fixed effect of condition in the model. 
This addition did improve the fit for the reduced model significantly: 
(χ2(2)	=	337.7,	p < .001). Thus the impact of different health states on 
SWB differed depending on whether judgments were made about 
one's own self in the present, oneself in the future, or other people. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize these findings.
The significant effect of severity is visible in Figure 1, where the 
mean SWB change appears to decrease approximately linearly with 
severity. Table 1 shows that the fixed effect of perspective was sig‐
nificant, such that overall predicted SWB change was smaller in the 
“future” condition, relative to the “present” condition. This effect is 
visible in Figure 1, where the means for the predicted well‐being of 
future self were higher across severities and in all domains than in 
the other two conditions. It is also clear that the effect was very 
small in magnitude. It is evident that the predicted SWB changes in 
the other condition were lower than responses in the other two con‐
ditions, but once again, this effect was of a negligible magnitude.
How severe were affective forecasting errors among our partici‐
pants? Table 2 and Figure 2 shows the comparison between coeffi‐
cients for each level obtained in the current study (present self‐, future 
self‐, other, and all conditions combined) with those obtained by Dolan 
et al. (2012) and Brazier et al. (2002).4 The p values were calculated 
1 This	analysis	is	conservative	in	that	it	assumes	a	monotonic	increase	in	severity	with	
SF‐6D states. Here we note that our results are largely unchanged if we included all 
participants in our analysis.
2 Note	that	this	is	not	an	exact	replication	of	this	analysis	as	some	of	our	predictors	
differed from those used by Dolan et al. For example, while Dolan and colleagues had 
access to the exact income of the respondents, we only had 19 income intervals to 
choose from.
3 Inclusion	of	personality	scores	also	had	very	little	effect	and	we	did	not	include	these	in	
our results and discussion.
4 Coefficients	were	not	estimated	simultaneously	as	in	Dolan	et	al.	(2012).	Instead,	each	
domain was analysed independently, regressing SWB on levels of a particular domain. 
These models allow for a random effect of subject, which controls for different baseline 
SWB of the participants.
TA B L E  1   Results of the reduced model with perspective as a 
fixed effect
Fixed effects Estimate (SE) t p value
Intercept −.149	(.014) −10.59 <.001
Pain −.089	(.005) −16.60 <.001
Physical −.105	(.005) −19.71 <.001
Role .040	(.006) 7.18 <.001
Social .022	(.005) 4.01 <.001
Vitality −.011	(.005) −18.66 <.001
Severity 2 .231	(.007) 34.14 <.001
Severity 3 .335	(.007) 49.60 <.001
Severity	4 .500	(.007) 73.88 <.001
Severity	5 .617	(.007) 89.54 <.001
Severity 6 .706	(.008) 89.31 <.001
Condition: future −.039	(.019) −2.08 .038
Condition: other .038 (.019) 1.94 .053
Conditional R2:	.858
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using the Satterthwaite approximation (lmerTest package in R; 
Kuznetsova,	Brockhoff,	&	Christensen,	2017).
The results revealed significant affective forecasting errors in all 
domains and across all health states. Overall, forecasts of the effects 
of the SF‐6D on SWB produced much larger coefficients than those 
based on SWB ratings obtained when the health states have already 
been experienced. In Dolan et al. (2012), the largest negative coeffi‐
cient	is	−.145	on	the	fifth	level	of	mental	health,	representing	a	14.5%	
drop in life satisfaction. However, for our model of forecast life satis‐
faction,	the	coefficient	on	the	fifth	level	of	Mental	Health	was	−.707	
for data pooled across perspective treatments, representing a much 
larger anticipated drop in life satisfaction. This pattern held for all di‐
mensions, with most coefficients being at least several times larger 
than those obtained via revealed preference methods.
How does the ranking of different domains implied by our re‐
sults compare with that estimated by Dolan et al. (2012) and Brazier 
et al. (2002)? In contrast to the SF‐6D tariff, the pain dimension has 
the smallest negative effect on SWB. The forecasts of life satisfac‐
tion reported here appeared to be in line with the findings reported 
by Dolan et al. (2012). Coefficients for mental health were higher 
than those for physical functioning and pain. On the other hand, 
predicted impact of vitality was comparable in magnitude to that of 
pain and physical functioning, which (in ordinal terms) is more in line 
with the results of Brazier et al. (2002). Thus, despite the consider‐
able general overestimation of effects on future SWB, the ranks of 
predicted SWB effects over domains were relatively consistent with 
those obtained using experienced SWB methods.
While not directly relevant to affective forecasting, some varia‐
tion in the relation between the forecast SWB change and the levels 
of severity was observed.5 Figure 1 shows a relatively equal spacing 
5 We	note	that	the	different	levels	of	the	SF‐6D	need	not	be	interpreted	as	monotonically	
increasing in severity, although they frequently are so treated in practice.
F I G U R E  1   Standardized predicted SWB changes across all levels and domains of the SF‐6D and across all three conditions. Error bars 
represent ± 2 standard errors of the means
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between the levels of severity in each domain. The anticipated impact 
on well‐being follows a rather monotonic trend in each panel of 
Figure	1.	However,	 two	exceptions	must	be	noted.	First,	 level	5	of	
physical	functioning	is	perceived	as	less	detrimental	than	level	4	(al‐
though confidence intervals overlap between the two). Interestingly, 
the wording of these levels also shows some inconsistencies, as level 
4	of	Physical	functioning	is	described	by	“Your	health	limits	you	a	lot	
in moderate activities,”	whereas	 level	5	 is	described	by	“Your	health	
limits you a little in bathing and dressing.” This jump from “moderate 
activities” to “bathing and dressing” might have been responsible for 
the observed violation of monotonicity. In the second instance, levels 
2,	3,	and	4	of	role	limitations	domain	appear	to	be	rated	as	if	they	had	
an	equal	negative	impact	on	one's	level	of	well‐being.	A	similar	pat‐
tern was observed by Dolan et al. (2012) and Brazier et al. (2002). 
Although	the	sizes	of	their	coefficients	were	very	different,	the	con‐
sistent impact of role functioning limitations across various levels was 
also present in their data. Here again, the wording of the four levels in 
the SF‐6D (except for Level 1) do not offer an easily quantifiable 
indication of magnitude. In other domains, severity is explained in 
terms of the symptoms' frequency or duration, while in case of the 
role limitations the ordering is based on the mixture of symptoms, 
with: physical health (level 2), emotional problems (level 3) 
to	physical	health	and	emotional	problems	(level	4).
In sum, it appears that participants largely overestimated the 
impact	of	 future	health	on	their	SWB.	Although	we	observed	that	
perspective‐taking influenced people's estimates, the size of these 
effects was too small to alleviate the general overestimation.
4  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
We examined people's ability to predict the relationship between 
hypothetical future health states they might experience and their 
future SWB. Our goal was to determine whether it is possible to ob‐
tain reasonable valuations of health states by explicitly asking peo‐
ple to predict the impact different health states would have on SWB. 
TA B L E  2   Coefficients (reversed in sign) of the current study and those obtained by Dolan et al. (2012) and Brazier et al. (2002)
Current study
Dolan et al. 
(2012)
Brazier et al. 
(2002)Self‐Present Self‐Future Average‐Other Conditions pooled
Physical	2 −.189*** 	(.18) −.157*** 	(.017) −.223*** 	(.016) −.189*** 	(.010) .003	(.005) −.035
Physical	3 −.307*** 	(.18) −.249*** 	(.017) −.294*** 	(.016) −.282*** 	(.010) −.009	(.007) −.035
Physical	4 −.497*** 	(.18) −.430*** 	(.017) −.432*** 	(.016) −.451*** 	(.010) −.018	(.012) −.044
Physical	5 −.472*** 	(.18) −.395*** 	(.017) −.343*** 	(.016) −.401*** 	(.010) −.091** 	(.019) −.056
Physical	6 −.653*** 	(.18) −.588*** 	(.017) −.595*** 	(.016) −.611*** 	(.010) −.075*** 	(.019) −.117
Pain	2 −.172*** 	(.017) −.197*** 	(.017) −.208*** 	(.016) −.193*** 	(.010) −.001	(.004) −.042
Pain	3 −.320*** 	(.017) −.306*** 	(.017) −.311*** 	(.016) −.312*** 	(.010) −.006	(.005) −.042
Pain	4 −.452*** 	(.017) −.436*** 	(.017) −.452*** 	(.016) −.446*** 	(.010) −.007	(.008) −.065
Pain	5 −.579*** 	(.017) −.541*** 	(.017) −.572*** 	(.016) −.563*** 	(.010) −.013	(.009) −.102
Pain	6 −.712*** 	(.017) −.649*** 	(.017) −.730*** 	(.016) −.695*** 	(.010) −.048*** 	(.014) −.171
Role 2 −.485*** 	(.020) −.403*** 	(.017) −.474*** 	(.014) −.452*** 	(.010) .005	(.006) −.053
Role 3 −.461*** 	(.020) −.444*** 	(.017) −.486*** 	(.014) −.463*** 	(.010) −.045*** 	(.010) −.053
Role	4 −.538*** 	(.020) −.472*** 	(.017) −.543*** 	(.014) −.516*** 	(.010) −.037*** 	(.009) −.053
Mental 2 −.254*** 	(.019) −.231*** 	(.018) −.253*** 	(.016) −.246*** 	(.010) −.037*** 	(.004) −.042
Mental 3 −.356*** 	(.019) −.332*** 	(.018) −.353*** 	(.016) −.347*** 	(.010) −.066*** 	(.005) −.042
Mental	4 −.603*** 	(.019) −.566*** 	(.018) −.631*** 	(.016) −.600*** 	(.010) −.090*** 	(.010) −.1
Mental	5 −.706*** 	(.019) −.663*** 	(.018) −.753*** 	(.016) −.707*** 	(.010) −.145*** 	(.016) −.118
Social 2 −.247*** 	(.019) −.211*** 	(.017) −.227*** 	(.016) −.227*** 	(.010) −.023*	(.007) −.059
Social 3 −.354*** 	(.019) −.307*** 	(.017) −.351*** 	(.016) −.336*** 	(.010) −.054*** 	(.009) −.072
Social	4 −.530*** 	(.019) −.501*** 	(.017) −.581*** 	(.016) −.536*** 	(.	010) −.043*** 	(.016) −.087
Social	5 .653*** 	(.019) −.620*** 	(.017) −.691*** 	(.016) −.654*** 	(.010)
Vitality 2 −.077* 	(.018) −.081** 	(.016) −.078*** 	(.015) −.079*** 	(.010) −.020** 	(.008) 0
Vitality 3 −.291*** 	(.018) −.262*** 	(.016) −.266*** 	(.015) −.272*** 	(.010) −.044*** 	(.009) −.071
Vitality	4 −.472*** 	(.018) −.416*** 	(.016) −.460*** 	(.015) −.448*** 	(.010) −.085*** 	(.011) −.071
Vitality	5 −.690*** 	(.018) −.635*** 	(.016) −.682*** 	(.015) −.668*** 	(.010) −.097*** 	(.012) −.092
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***p	<	.01;	**p	<	.05;	*p	<	.05.	
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Given that human judgment often shows significant affective fore‐
casting errors, we attempted to debias people's expectations using 
psychological distancing manipulations. Our findings paint a rather 
pessimistic picture of people's ability to anticipate how different 
states of health will affect their well‐being. In our experiment, we 
found that for each SF‐6D domain the impact of ill health was greatly 
overpredicted and that this overprediction was not eliminated when 
participants were asked to make predictions about themselves in 
the future or about other people. We found that making predictions 
about future selves leads to the smallest, albeit still considerable, 
overestimation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 health	 states	 on	 SWB.	A	 key	 im‐
plication of our results is that formulation of social policy based on 
experienced SWB (e.g., as obtained from survey data) will likely be 
paternalistic, as such formulation will involve overriding people's be‐
liefs about their own future SWB.
Research on using SWB to inform and evaluate policies is still in 
its early stage (Fujiwara & Campbell, 2011). Few efforts have been 
made to use well‐being predictions to determine the relative impor‐
tance	of	different	health	domains.	A	notable	exception	is	the	work	
of	Ubel,	Loewenstein,	and	Jepson	(2005)	who	attempted	to	debias	
people's predictions about the emotional impact of chronic illness 
in a number of ways. The authors encouraged their participants to 
think more broadly about various aspects of their life that could be 
affected by their illnesses. Consistent with our own findings, the 
debiasing techniques did not work, with some resulting in even 
larger overestimation of the negative emotions experienced during 
the	illnesses.	Ubel	et	al.	(2005)	were,	however,	successful	in	reducing	
the bias by reminding their participants about their ability to adapt 
to adverse events. Even here, however, the effect was modest in 
magnitude	 (see	also	Damschroder,	Zikmund‐Fisher,	&	Ubel,	2005).	
Our findings contribute to this literature by documenting an unsuc‐
cessful psychological intervention to reduce affective forecasting 
errors (Dillard, Fagerlin, Dal Cin, Zikmund‐Fisher, & Ubel, 2010; Ubel 
et	al.,	2005).
F I G U R E  2   Weights for current study, Dolan et al. (2012), and Brazier et al. (2002)
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A	 key	 conclusion	 of	Dolan	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 concerns	 the	 impor‐
tance of mental health over physical pain in SWB, and mental 
health also ranked higher than other domains in the SWB predic‐
tions that we obtained. However, the opposite is true of vitality, 
which was assigned lower weight than pain in our data. Despite 
the discrepancy in magnitude between our coefficients and those 
obtained by other authors, the revealed importance of mental 
health is consistent with the work of Dolan and colleagues. Since 
predictions related to different health states often fail to take into 
account adaptation (Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Kahneman & Thaler, 
2006), the impact of illnesses to which adaptation does not apply 
will likely be underestimated in preference‐based frameworks. 
Interestingly, our respondents did expect that their happiness 
would deteriorate more if they experience the highest levels of 
mental illness as compared to the highest intensities of pain or 
limitations to physical functioning. Less consistent findings were 
observed for vitality, which appears to be ranked as highly in 
terms of its predicted impact on SWB as are pain and physical 
functioning. This differs from the findings of Dolan et al. (2012), 
who reported that vitality coefficients largely exceeded those of 
pain, role limitations, social functioning and physical limitations. 
Excluding mental health, impact of severity level appeared to be 
the same in different domains, a finding more consistent with the 
Brazier et al. (2002) estimates.
In summary, people were unable to predict accurately how their 
SWB would change under different hypothetical health states. The 
discrepancy between anticipated and experienced health related SWB 
raises issues for the application of SWB approaches in public policy. 
Should attempts at welfare maximization focus on experienced SWB 
(as measured by surveys) or on people's statements about what they 
believe will make them happiest? Dolan and Kahneman (2008) express 
pessimism about using decision utility to inform health‐care decisions 
on the grounds that estimates of one's future hypothetical health 
state are biased by the focusing illusion (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). 
Consequently, assessment of future utility is highly biased by imme‐
diate negative emotions felt toward a health state, with responses 
largely	reflecting	currently	experienced	feelings	of	fear	or	dread.	Yet,	
using experienced SWB as a target for public policy seems paternalis‐
tic in that it involves overriding people's own beliefs about their own 
future SWB. Targeting public policies on the basis of people's predic‐
tions about their own well‐being, on the other hand, requires policy‐
makers to ignore a large body of evidence on experienced subjective 
well‐being. One possibility—not explored here—may lie in educating 
people in the results of prior research on experienced SWB. Would 
people's predictions about the consequences of ill health for their own 
future SWB become more accurate if they were informed about the 
SWB of people who had experienced those conditions? We leave this 
question as a direction for future research.
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